Subprime Refinancing: Equity Extraction and Mortgage Termination by Pennington-Cross, Anthony & Chomsisengphet, Souphala
Marquette University
e-Publications@Marquette
Finance Faculty Research and Publications Finance, Department of
7-1-2007
Subprime Refinancing: Equity Extraction and
Mortgage Termination
Anthony Pennington-Cross
Marquette University, anthony.pennington-cross@marquette.edu
Souphala Chomsisengphet
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
Accepted version. Real Estate Economics, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Summer 2007): 233-263. DOI. © 2007
Wiley. Used with permission.
 1 
Subprime Refinancing: Equity Extraction and Mortgage Termination 
Introduction 
Declining interest rates provided incentives for many homeowners to refinance their 
mortgages (rate refinancing) and significant increases in house prices enabled many of 
these homeowners to extract equity from their home when refinancing (cash-out 
refinancing).  As shown in table 1, according to the 2001 Residential Finance Survey 
(RFS)1 the majority of refinances (64 percent) were able to lower their interest rate and 
significant fractions (27 percent) were able extract equity.2  While equity extraction is 
common in the prime mortgage market, it is even more prevalent in the subprime 
mortgage market.3  The 2001 RFS indicates that while 64 percent of prime refinances 
were for a rate reduction, only 40 percent of subprime refinances included a rate 
reduction.  In addition, while 26 percent of prime refinances extract equity 49 percent of 
subprime refinances extracted equity.  Consistent with these survey results, larger data 
sets confirm that a much higher proportion of refinances take cash out in the subprime 
mortgage market.4  We find in this paper that more than 85 percent of fixed-rate owner-
                                                 
1
 The 2001 RFS samples approximately 68,000 Census 2000 address records.  Information in the survey 
includes the reason for refinancing and whether the loan is considered subprime. 
2
 Freddie Mac reports a much higher cash-out or equity extraction rate: 53 percent of all refinances in 2001.  
Freddie Mac also reports large swings in cash-out rates, ranging from 88 percent in 1990 to 36 percent in 
2003 over the 1985-2004 time period. 
3
 The mortgage market is bifurcated into the prime market and the subprime market.  The prime market 
serves those households with a sufficiently good history of making timely credit payments and the 
subprime market serves households with an inconsistent or seriously delinquent history of making credit 
payments.  As a result, borrowers in the subprime mortgage market pay a substantial premium over the 
prevailing prime rate and tend to be liquidity constrained. 
4
 Freddie Mac reports that in the prime market in 2003 approximately 36 percent of refinances extracted 
equity from the home; in the subprime market in 2003, over 75 percent of refinances extracted equity 
(Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross 2005).While Freddie Mac may purchase a few loans of subprime 
quality the vast majority can presumably be considered to be of prime quality.  See 
(www.freddiemac.com/news/finance/data.html). 
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occupied subprime refinances extracted equity through a cash-out refinance over the 
1996-2003 time period. 
This paper conducts two analyses of refinanced equity extraction.  First, we examine the 
choice of borrowers to extract wealth from housing in the high-cost (subprime) segment 
of the mortgage market.  Second, we follow the performance of the same loans through 
time and compare the prepayment and default termination of cash-out refinance loans to 
rate refinance loans.  This segment of the market is an ideal one to study because of the 
prevalence of credit-constrained borrowers and equity extraction.  The estimation of the 
choice to extract equity explicitly considers the fact that equity extraction is not lending 
for homeownership but is better viewed as one alternative available to consumers to 
finance consumption.  For example, as shown in table 2, the RFS indicated that the cash 
extracted from the home’s equity is often used to make home improvements, pay or 
consolidate existing debts and expenses, and purchase cars. Therefore, mortgage debt is a 
substitute for other forms of consumer debt financing (e.g., credit cards and car loans).  
The utilization of such debt should therefore be sensitive to both (i) the relative costs of 
financing debt and (ii) traditional mortgage risk measures such as changes in interest 
rates, down payments, and credit scores that are used to underwrite mortgages.   
After origination, cash-out refinances may perform differently from typical or non-cash-
out, rate refinances.  In particular, since removing cash will by definition reduce the 
amount of equity in the loan, borrowers may be more sensitive in terms of the probability 
of defaulting to changes in house prices.  In addition, whether through learning or 
through necessity those who have taken cash out in the past may be more likely to 
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terminate the mortgage through prepayment in the future.  This paper examines these 
issues in a discrete time proportional hazard model using over 80,000 subprime 
mortgages followed from the beginning of 1996 through the end of 2003. 
In the following section, we discuss in more detail why households refinance their 
mortgage.  Section 3 empirically assesses the decision of subprime borrowers to extract 
the equity from their home while refinancing.  Section 4 compares the performance of the 
cash-out loans to the non-cash-out loans. Finally, Section 5 concludes.  
Rate Refinancing versus Cash-out Refinancing    
A mortgage contains a call option that gives the borrower the right to prepay the 
mortgage at any time. Option-pricing models show that the valuation and exercise of the 
option are strongly tied to interest rates and their movement through time, as well as 
borrower characteristics (see, e.g., Dunn and McConnel, 1981; Green and Shoven, 1986; 
Schwartz and Torous, 1989; Clapp, Goldberg, Harding, and LaCour-Little, 2001)). 
Households can reduce their monthly mortgage payments by prepaying their existing 
mortgages and obtain a new mortgage with lower interest rate.  Furthermore, other 
pricing models (e.g., Follain, Scott, and Yang, 1992) value the call option by comparing 
the savings from refinancing and the transaction costs associated with refinancing. When 
the savings benefit of the interest rate reduction outweighs the transaction costs, the call 
option is said to be optimally “in the money” and rational homeowners will refinance. 
However, even if the call option is in the money, not all borrowers are able to refinance 
their mortgages. Borrowers’ ability to refinance can be constrained by other factors such 
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unemployment, income, and/or credit quality (see, e.g., Archer, Ling and McGill, 1993; 
Stanton, 1995, Green and LaCour-Little, 1997; Peristiana et al., 1997). In addition, 
homeowners who face depreciation in their home may have insufficient collateral and 
thus are unable to refinance (Caplin, Freeman and Tracy 1997; Bennet, Peach, and 
Peristiani, 2000; Nothaft and Chang 2004).   
The amount of equity affects households’ decision and ability to extract the equity 
(Canner, Dynan and Passmore 2002). Households, particularly those who are liquidity-
constrained, cash out the equity in their home because they want to fund current and 
future consumption (e.g., home improvement, children’s education, or even vacations) or 
because they are financially constrained in the face of adverse shocks (e.g., a homeowner 
encountering a loss of job, a large medical bill, divorce expenses, and tuition expenses of 
a child) (Hurst 1999, Hurst and Stafford 2003). Consistent with the theory that liquidity-
constrained households are more likely to use equity from the house to smooth 
consumption, the RFS shows that subprime borrowers are more likely than prime 
borrowers to take equity out of the house through a cash-out refinance.  In fact, Hurst and 
Stafford (2003) actually show that liquidity-constrained households use 60 percent of 
cashed-out equity to finance current consumption.5  Agarwal, Driscoll, and Laibson 
(2003) observe in their sample that some households prepay even when current market 
                                                 
5
 Benjamin and Chinloy (2005) show that consumption from housing wealth is a misleading concept.  
Instead, consumption is associated with an increase in the size of the overall balance sheet.  For example, 
extracting wealth out of the house increases liabilities and cash equally, thus leaving net wealth unchanged, 
but the balance sheet is larger. On the other hand, evidence from the U.S. National Income and Products 
Accounts (NIPA), the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), and international data sources all show 
that the propensity to consume from housing wealth is greater than the propensity to consume from over-all 
wealth or wealth stored in equities such as stocks or bonds (Benjamin, Chinloy, and Jud 2004a,b, Bayoumi 
and Edison 2003, Case, Quigley, and Shiller 2001, and Carrol, Dynan, and Krane 2003). 
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rates are above the existing contract rate.  Younger households may also be more likely to 
extract equity because they are more likely to be liquidity constrained (Lehnert 2004).   
Empirical Model: The Decision to Extract Equity 
The prior discussion indicates that the choice to extract equity while refinancing can be 
impacted by various factors: 
( )iiii CHBfS ,,=  (1) 
S indicates the choice to take cash out when refinancing, i indexes each loan, B represents 
borrower characteristics, H represents housing and mortgage characteristics, and C 
represents the relative cost of non-mortgage alternatives to finance consumption. 
Borrower Characteristics: The literature suggests that negative income shocks should 
increase the probability of liquidity-constrained borrowers taking cash out of the house 
for consumption.  For example, using data from the PSID Hurst and Stafford (2004) use 
the households’ report of whether they experienced an unemployment spell as a proxy for 
a negative income shock.  An unemployment spell was found to have significant and 
positive impact on the probability of refinancing.  However, the impact on equity 
extraction was positive, but significant only with a p-value of 9 percent.  Nothaft and 
Chang (2004) used the American Housing Survey and found that older households are 
less likely to take cash out, but are also less likely to refinance in general.  In addition, 
Lehnert (2004), also using the PSID, finds that the marginal propensity to consume (as 
measured by food consumption), when house prices change is impacted by life cycle 
concerns.  Therefore, the age of the household and local unemployment rates may impact 
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households’ decision to extract equity while refinancing.  In addition, households with 
more income may have more liquid assets and may find it less necessary to extract wealth 
from housing. 
Housing and Mortgage Characteristics: In order to extract wealth there must first be 
some equity in the house.  However, low equity has also been shown to reduce the ability 
of both prime and subprime borrowers to refinance regardless of the cash-out status 
(Pennington-Cross 2003, Danis and Pennington-Cross 2005).  Since low-equity will deter 
both non-cash-out and cash-out refinances, it is an empirical question whether equity 
extraction is deterred more than typical refinances.  Nothaft and Chang (2004) find that 
self-reported price increases in the prior two years does increase the probability of 
originating a cash-out refinance.  In contrast, Hurst and Stafford (2004) found no 
relationship between self-reported loan to value ratios and the extent of equity extraction.   
For the typical refinance, the main reason to refinance is to take advantage of a decrease 
in interest rates and reduce the monthly payment.  If equity extraction is less affected by 
the movement of interest rates, then we should expect the probability of households 
cashing out the equity to be relatively lower when interest rates are declining.  However, 
if equity extraction also relies on lower mortgage rates to make extraction attractive, then 
the probability of taking cash out during a refinance may be unaffected (relative to a 
typical refinance).  Therefore, it is an empirical question whether households’ decision to 
extract equity is positively or negatively affected by changes in interest rates and changes 
in house prices. 
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Relative Cost of Financing: Although not considered by the empirical literature, since 
the cash extracted from the house is often used to purchase other goods or to consolidate 
existing debt, the price or interest rate of alternative consumer lending sources should be 
considered.  For example, many households use the cash extracted to pay down existing 
credit card balances or to purchase a car.  Therefore, the cost of these types of consumer 
financing should be compared with the cost of using mortgage debt.   
Choice Data 
The empirical tests are conducted on subprime loans that have been securitized in the 
private label market.  The data was leased from Loanperformance.  It is loan level data 
from the ABS data series and includes a rich set of information describing the 
characteristics of the loan and the credit score of the borrower.  To reduce any 
unobserved heterogeneity, only single-family, owner-occupied, first-lien, fixed-rate 
mortgage refinances are included in the sample.   
Loans included in the sample were originated from January 1996 through December of 
2003.  Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross (2006) provide a detailed summary of the 
Loanperformance data and how it has evolved through time.  In general, the coverage of 
the subprime market increases with time and the performance of the loans is better (e.g., 
lower default rates) than those reported by the Mortgage Bankers Association of America 
(MBAA) for subprime loans.6   
                                                 
6
 MBAA indicates that their reported subprime statistics should not be viewed as representing the market.  
However on many dimensions the data set used in this paper also do not reflect the subprime mortgage 
market as a whole.  Some examples of potential selection issues include – the loan application was 
approved, the lender chose to securitize the loan, and the loan meets ABS criteria.  
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Table 3 provides summary statistics for the data set and a description of each variable 
included in the 1999-2003 period.  As noted previously, cash-out refinancing is an 
important source of financing for the constrained homeowner:  Over 85 percent of 
refinances extracted equity from the home by taking cash out.  In many respects, cash-out 
refinances are very similar to non-cash-out refinances with respect to borrower and loan 
characteristics.  For example, the FICO scores are within five points of one another and 
the median zip code incomes are within 2,000 dollars.  However, the cash-outs are fairly 
evenly spread across the years 1999 through 2003, while the no cash-outs are more 
heavily concentrated in 2002 and 2003. 
A logit model is estimated in STATA using maximum likelihood because the dependent 
variable is an indicator or dummy variable.  The probability of extracting wealth through 
a cash-out refinance can be calculated as: 
( ) 




+
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β
π
i
i
x
x
iii e
exS 11   (2) 
x represents a vector of borrower characteristics (B), housing and mortgage 
characteristics (H), the relative cost mortgage debt to other forms of financing 
consumption (C), and other exogenous factors (O).  
Borrower characteristics (B) are measured by credit score, income, and changes in 
unemployment rates.  Since extracting equity from a home is likely associated with a 
negative income or life event (divorce or other unexpected change in family structure), 
which should impair the ability of households to make timely debt payments, it is 
expected that higher credit scores should reduce the probability of taking cash out.  In 
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addition, while borrower age and income are unknown, we proxy by using the median 
age and median household income for the five-digit zip code of the house, as matched 
with the 2000 Census zip code tabulation area.7  It is expected that households with 
relatively higher income have buffers of liquid wealth and thus cash-out refinances are 
less likely to occur in higher income zip code areas.  On the other hand, cash-out 
refinances are more likely to occur in the younger income zip code areas because young 
households may not have had time to save enough money to have much liquid wealth.  In 
addition, changes in the metropolitan area unemployment rate are used to proxy for 
unemployment spells and negative income shocks, which are expected to increase the 
probability of households in the local area extracting equity from the house.  
Housing and mortgage characteristics (H) are measured by changes in house prices and 
interest rates.  Homeowners living in locations with rising house prices, measured by the 
percent change in the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) repeat 
sale house price index over the prior quarter8, are more likely to take cash out when 
refinancing.  These measures proxy for the extent that equity is available for extraction.  
The change in mortgage interest rates, measured by the change in prevailing rates for 30-
year fixed-rate mortgages and reported in the Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market 
Survey (PMMS) over the previous month, are also included.  It is an empirical question 
                                                 
7
 Zip code tabulation area (zcta) definitions are not perfect matches with actual postal zip codes.  For 
example, the census bureau did not calculate demographic and economic information for business only zip 
codes.  Therefore, the match of the postal zip codes in the loan level data may introduce some additional 
error in the estimated income and age variables due to spatial matching errors.  Specification tests using 
county level median income and age provided similar results. 
8
 Various time periods for the change in house prices were tested (one, five year, and ten year changes in 
prices).  Most performed similarly to the most recent quarter change in house prices likely reflecting the 
persistence in nominal price appreciation over the time period studied. 
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whether rising or falling rates should induce homeowners to take out cash when 
refinancing.   
Cost of consumer credit (C) is measured by the ratio of the interest rate on credit cards 
and new car loans compared to mortgage interest rates.  The mortgage rate is measured 
by the PMMS 30-year fixed-rate interest rate.  The interest rate for credit cards is 
measured by the commercial bank rate, and the interest rate on car loans is measured by 
the commercial bank rate on 48-month new car loans, both of which are reported 
quarterly by the Federal Reserve Board.9  It is expected that households will substitute 
mortgage debt for a credit card and an auto loan debt as it becomes relatively less 
expensive.  Table 4 provides summary statistics for the cost of consumer credit variables 
as well as a description of the variable and the source for the data.  Interest rates on credit 
cards are on average near two times as high as those on 30-year fixed-rate mortgages, 
while the interest rate on 48-month car loans is on average nearly 70 percent of 30-year 
fixed rate mortgages.  
Lastly, to control for other unobserved factors (O) such as changes in underwriting, 
financial market conditions, and other unobserved factors that could affect cash-out rates, 
we include dummy variables for the year of origination.  Table 4 shows the cash-out 
                                                 
9
 Note that the expected duration of a subprime mortgage, even 30-year fixed rate mortgages, is very short; 
given prevailing prepayment and default rates.  For example, the MBAA reports a conditional monthly in 
foreclosure rate over 7 percent and a 90 plus days delinquent rate over 3 percent for subprime loans from 
the middle of 2001 through the middle of 2003.  Danis and Pennington-Cross (2005) report a conditional 
monthly prepayment rate on subprime loans over 4 percent.  Therefore, a four year car loan has a similar if 
not even shorter duration than a subprime mortgage and the interest rate ratio will act as a reasonable proxy 
for the relative cost of debt.  
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loans are fairly evenly distributed from 1999 through 2003, while the no-cash-out loans 
are more concentrated in 2002 and 2003.  
Choice Results 
Table 5 presents the logit choice results and provides three different specifications.  In 
most specifications, almost all variables are significant and meet expectations.  In 
specification I, borrower, housing and other control variables are included.  In 
specifications II and III the relative cost of using other forms of financing are introduced.  
The results in Panel A show that cash-out refinances are more likely to occur in zip code 
areas with relatively young households as they age.  However the impact of the zip code 
median age is much different in location that are older.  To show this affect Age-35 is 
interacted with NYoung, a dummy variable indicating that zip code median household age 
is greater than or equal to 35 years.  The coefficient for the variable (Age-35)*NYoung  
will then show any differences in refinancing patterns in areas  with older households.  
The sign is negative and larger in magnitude than the impact of zip code age alone.  
Therefore, as young locations get older the probability of extracting equity increases, 
however, as older locations age the probability of extracting equity decreases.  Wald tests 
(Judge et al. 1985, p. 20-25) indicate that the sum of the two coefficients are statistically 
different from zero in all three specifications. 
Panel B reports the marginal effect of increasing any variable by one unit.  All marginal 
effects are reported as changes in the probability of the refinance loan taking cash out.  
All other variables are evaluated at their means except the year of origination, which is 
evaluated at 2003.     
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Cash out refinances are significantly lower in the zip code areas with relatively higher 
median income households.  Again, this result is consistent with expectations and may 
reflect the ability of areas with relatively higher income households to weather adverse 
income shocks.  The impact of an increasing unemployment rate has the expected 
positive sign, but is insignificant.  Specification tests with various lag lengths and the 
level of unemployment found similar results.  This may reflect the inaccurate nature of 
overall unemployment rates at metropolitan area levels as a proxy for individual 
unemployment.  However, using household-specific measures of unemployment spells in 
the PSID, Hurst and Stafford (2004) could only find a significant relationship at the 90 
percent level between unemployment and removal of equity.  Lastly, credit history does 
not have a significant impact on the likelihood of taking cash out.  However, in 
specification tests that did not include origination year dummies the credit score was 
negative and statistically significant. 
Refinances in locations that have experienced increases in house prices are more likely to 
be the cash-out variety simply because there should be more equity to extract.  However, 
in speciation tests that did not include dummy indicators for the year of origination the 
coefficient estimate was negative and significant.  The probability of extracting equity 
increases when interest rates drop.  This result is contrary to the results of Nothaft and 
Chang (2004), who found that while refinances in general increased when interest rates 
declined, the impact was much smaller for cash-out refinances.  Our results may differ 
because cash-out subprime borrowers are more sensitive to prevailing interest rate 
changes than prime borrowers.  For example, subprime borrowers are very constrained in 
their access to credit markets so that changes in prevailing rates may have larger impacts 
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on the present value of future payments, especially when compared with income and 
wealth levels. 
The impact of the year dummies are very strong and show that after controlling for 
borrower, housing, and mortgage characteristics, refinances are more likely to be cash-
out in all the years before 2003.  These results reflect many unobserved factors including 
changes in underwriting, data reporting and quality, shocks in the financial market, 
market consolidation, and other factors.     
Consumer Financing and Substitution Effects 
Specification II and III in Table 5 examine the use of home equity as a substitute for 
other forms of consumer financing while refinancing.  Specifically, the results indicate 
that the higher the relative cost of using a credit card or a car loan, proxied by the ratio of 
credit card and car loan interest rates to mortgage interest rates (icc/im and icar/im), the 
higher the probability of households extracting equity from a home.   
Specification II and III do not include any measure of the change in mortgage interest 
rates because they were highly correlated with the credit card and car loan interest rate 
ratios.  As compared with specification I, coefficient estimates proved to be robust to the 
inclusion of credit card and car loan relative interest rates.  However, the increased 
explanatory power associated with the cost variables is small. 
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Parameter Stability 
The time period from 1996 through 2003 saw many changes in the subprime mortgage 
market.  The industry has changed from a fringe market niche dominated by smaller 
finance companies to an important segment of both the primary and secondary market 
dominated by household names such as Countrywide, Indy Mac, Ameriquest and others.  
The change in market structure as the subprime market has matured may be associated 
with different underwriting standards and, as a result, parameter estimates for loans 
originated in different time periods may differ.   
To test for parameter stability through time, specification I in Table 5 is re-estimated 
separately for six different origination cohorts.  Selected parameter estimates are 
presented in table 6 for each of the origination cohorts.  Because the sample of loans is 
much smaller in earlier years all loans originated in the years 1996 through 1998 are 
grouped into one cohort.  The remaining cohorts represent all loans originated during the 
indicated calendar year.  The most consistent results are the impact of median zip code 
age (increasing for the young and decreasing for the not-young), and median zip code 
income.  Not surprisingly, given the prior results, unemployment rates are never 
significant. 
Perhaps the most intriguing pattern of results is that of credit scores.  In the early years 
higher credit scores were associated with more equity extraction, while in 2002 and 2003 
higher credit scores were associated with a lower probability of extracting credit.  Again, 
this likely reflects changing underwriting standards and the increasing use of automated 
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underwriting in the subprime mortgage market.  The impact of changing house prices is 
both positive and negative and only significant for 2003.  Since regional house prices are 
only a rough approximation of actual individual property equity it is not surprising that 
the full sample is necessary to estimate the coefficient with sufficient precision.  The 
impact of changing interest rates is usually significant but is both positive and negative.10 
Termination Characteristics of Cash-out Refinance Loans 
After the loan has been originated, the borrower may continue making payment or 
terminate the loan through default or prepayment.  Given the prevalence of cash-out 
refinances in general, and especially in the subprime market, the difference in the 
performance of these loans from that of standard refinances could impact the pricing of 
mortgages and the long term viability of housing equity as a source of wealth used to 
finance consumption. 
This section follows the prepayment and default behavior of the same 87,031 subprime 
loans used in the equity extraction estimation.   Figure 1 plots the calculated monthly 
conditional prepay rate11 for the cash-out and no cash-out loans.  It shows that over the 
first 20 months of a loan’s life, cash-out loans on average tend to prepay less often.  
Figure 2 presents the conditional monthly default rate and also shows that cash-out loans 
on average tend to default less often.  For both cash-out and no-cash-out loans, the 
default rate ramps up over the first year to a year and a half and then tends to level out 
                                                 
10
 Although not reported, the same tests were conducted on specification II and III in Table 5.  The credit 
card results were large insignificant and the car results were largely significant and mostly positive. 
11
 The conditional rate reports the percent of loans that terminate due to default or prepayment in the 
current month conditional on the loan surviving through the end of the prior month. 
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and oscillate around a fixed rate.  For cash-out loans, the default fixed rate is in the 0.3 to 
0.4 percent range; and for no-cash-out loans, the default fixed rate is in the 0.4 to 0.6 
percent range.  These figures indicate that cash-out loans may default and prepay at 
different rates and respond differently to shocks that may increase or decrease the 
propensity to terminate through default or prepayment. 
The termination of a mortgage can be viewed as an outcome of two competing risks – the 
risk of default and the risk of prepayment.  In each time period, the borrower has the 
option to put the mortgage and default or call the mortgage and prepay.  In empirical 
studies of mortgage termination in the prime market, how much it is in the money to put 
the mortgage is often proxied by measures of how much equity is in the home.  How 
much it is in the money to call the mortgage is often proxied by changes in interest rates 
since the loan was originated.  Life events, typically called trigger events, may also 
trigger default or prepayment of a mortgage.  For example, a change in family structure 
through divorce, life cycle issues such as trading up or down in the market, getting a 
better or new job in a different city or location, death or a severe illness, and many other 
factors can induce a household to move and prepay or even default on the mortgage  
(Clapp, Goldberg, Harding, and LaCour-Little 2001, Foster and Van Order 1984, Kau, 
Keenan, and Kim 1994a-b, Kau and  Keenan 1995, and Quercia and Stegman 1992 for an 
early review of the literature).   
Studies focusing on the subprime mortgage market have found that subprime loans tend 
to respond to the same economic incentives to default and prepay, although with different 
intensities.  For example, subprime loans are less responsive to changes in interest rates 
 17 
than prime loans, while prepaying more often when it is out of the money (rising interest 
rates).  In addition, loans that have been delinquent over long periods of time tend to 
prepay instead of default and show relatively high default correlation rates in the most 
expensive segments of the market (Alexander et al. 2002, Cowan and Cowan 2004, 
Pennington-Cross 2003, and Danis and Pennington-Cross 2005). 
We use a multinomial logit model to reflect the competing risk of prepayment and 
default.  Allison (1984, 1995) shows that when the data is set up in discrete time as in a 
panel data set, the multinomial logit produces the same likelihood function as a discrete 
time proportional hazards model.  By restricting sum of the probability of default, 
prepayment, and continuing to one, the multinomial model controls directly for the 
competing risks.  The likelihood function is an extension of the bivariate logit model used 
in the previous section and is as follows: 
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dijt is an indicator variable equal to 1 if outcome j occurs for loan i at time t and zero 
otherwise, α are the coefficients to be estimated, and z represents the explanatory 
variables. 
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The multinomial logit model has been used to study the performance and termination of 
loans (for example, Phillips and VanderHoff 2004 and Heitfield and Sabarwal 2004).  
However, the model does assume the independence of irrelevant alternatives, which 
implies that the odds ratio of a pair of outcomes is independent of any of the alternative 
outcomes.  In addition, the panel data set up also requires that the outcome in any point in 
time is independent of outcomes in any previous time period.  While observations are 
assumed to be independent between loans, multiple observations for each loan are 
allowed to be dependent.  A robust or the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance is 
used in place of the traditional calculation.  Clapp, Deng, and An (2004) provide an 
extensive discussion of the various benefits and costs of the various choices available for 
competing risk and find that the multinomial model produced conservative coefficient 
estimates relative to models incorporating unobserved heterogeneity.   
Termination Data and Empirical Specification 
Table 7 provides a description of each variable used in the panel estimation data set.  This 
data set contains the same loans described in the previous section in table 3, but follows 
each loan through time until observations are censored or the loan terminates through 
default or prepayment.  Defaults are defined as any month where the loan is identified as 
in foreclosure or the real estate is owned by the investor and prepayment is defined as any 
loan that is paid in full and was alive in the prior time period (current or delinquent).12  
On average, the monthly default rate is 0.27 percent and the monthly prepayment rate is 
2.05 percent.  Table 8 provides means and standard deviations for key variables broken 
                                                 
12
 While it may be common for lenders in general to report loan termination with loss mitigation as 
prepayment rather than default, neither the data fields nor the loan documentation provide any indication of 
this specific type of termination event. 
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down by loan purpose – no-cash-out refinance and cash-out refinance.  On average, the 
cash-out loans tend to have a slightly lower monthly default rate and almost identical 
prepayment rate, which is somewhat surprising because higher default rates are generally 
associated with higher Loan-to-Values (LTVs), both at origination and in the current 
month.  Beyond these differences, cash-out loans look very similar to non-cash-out loans. 
Prior literature on mortgage performance can help identify important proxies for trigger 
events, ability to pay, and the extent that it is in the money to call the mortgage and 
prepay or put the mortgage and default. 
The baseline probabilities are estimated from the age of the loan.  All other variables are 
then interpreted as proportional shifts up or down in the baseline probability.  In order not 
to superimpose an arbitrary shape to the baseline a step-wise linear function is estimated 
using ten age categories with the reference age being loan-months with age greater than 
60 months. 
Trigger events are proxied by the metropolitan area unemployment rate.  Locations that 
have higher unemployment rates are more likely to be associated with individual 
borrower unemployment spells.  These spells can make it difficult to continue making 
mortgage payments.  Higher unemployment rates have been associated with higher rates 
of default in both the prime and subprime mortgage markets.  However, the impact of 
unemployment on prepayment can be either negative or positive.  For example, using 
subprime loans, Quercia, Stegman, and Davis (2005) find that state unemployment rates 
are associated with a higher probability of default and a lower probability of prepayment.  
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Using prime loans, Deng, Quigley, and Van Order (2000) find state unemployment rates 
to be associated with higher and lower probabilities of prepaying, depending on location.  
When having trouble making the monthly payments, a borrower may try to prepay a 
mortgage instead of defaulting, if the cost of prepaying is lower than the cost of 
defaulting.  Defaulting on a mortgage will have a longer-lasting impact on the 
household’s ability to borrow and the cost of borrowing in the future.   
In addition, gaining employment may be more difficult because many employers conduct 
credit history checks prior to employment.  Therefore, it may be preferable for the 
borrower to either sell the house and provide the proceeds to the lender (often referred to 
as a pre-foreclosure sale) or hand the property over to the lender in exchange for 
extinguishing the debt (often called a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure).  In fact, lenders may 
also wish to avoid the costs of foreclosure and even allow short sales of property (the 
debt is extinguished although the sale of the property does not cover all of the remaining 
debt).  Danis and Pennington-Cross (2005) provide evidence of pre-foreclosure sales by 
showing that loans that are delinquent for a long time tend to prepay at elevated rates and 
much more often than they enter foreclosure or default. 
Credit scores show the success that the borrower has had in meeting prior financial 
obligations and are used by lenders to screen and price mortgages.  A series of papers has 
shown that the borrower’s credit score at origination, typically the Fair Isaac consumer 
credit score (or FICO score), is positively associated with prepayments and negatively 
associated with defaults in both the prime and subprime mortgage markets (For example, 
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Alexander et al 2002, Calem and Wachter 1999, Pennington-Cross 2003, and Quercia, 
Stegman, and Davis 2005).     
To proxy for the extent that it may be in the money to put the mortgage and go into 
default, the estimated current LTV (Cltv) is included.  To calculate Cltv, a measure of 
current house prices and the outstanding balance of the mortgage are needed in each time 
period.  House prices are updated through time using the Office of Federal Housing 
Enterprise Oversight repeat sale house price index.  The actual mortgage balance in each 
month is used instead of the amortizations schedule as most prior research has done.  It 
may make sense for a borrower to enter default if the property is in negative equity, since 
this implies that the value of the mortgage is larger than the value of the home.  In 
addition, since there are transaction costs, as well as other costs associated with 
defaulting, and potential benefits if the borrower waits, the option to put the mortgage is 
not instantaneously enacted when the Cltv is greater than 1 (negative equity).  Therefore, 
a continuous Cltv is included in the estimation.  Since the current value of the house is 
unobserved and estimated using a repeat sale price index , a measure of the accuracy of 
the updated house price is also included -- called the standard error of the OFHEO House 
Price Index (sehpi).  Sehpi is derived from the multistage process used to estimate the 
repeat sales price index.  It estimates the diffusion of individual price appreciation rates 
around the index as the last observed price becomes further in the past.  The more volatile 
the diffusion, the more likely the individual house price may have increased or decreased 
substantially more than the overall index.  This measure has typically been used to 
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calculate the probability of negative equity.13  The specification approach in this paper is 
to separate out the two components (Cltv and Sehpi) and allow the coefficients to vary.     
The origination LTV (Ltv) is also included, but this does not proxy for the option to put 
the mortgage; instead it reflects the unique underwriting criteria used by subprime 
lenders.  In particular, as discussed in detail by Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross 
(2005), borrowers with lower credit scores are required to compensate by proving larger 
initial down payments.  This approach allows lenders to at least partially reduce credit 
risk associated with higher default-risk loans (lower credit scores).  The ability of 
borrowers to provide large down payments may also provide more unobserved 
information about the household’s balance sheet and inherent riskiness (Harrison, 
Noordewier, and Yavas 2004). 
To proxy for the extent that it is in the money to put the mortgage and refinance, we 
include the change in interest rates from origination and the current month (∆i).  If 
interest rates increase, then refinancing will lead to higher interest rates and larger 
monthly payments even if the mortgage size is not increased.  If interest rates have 
declined, it is more likely that refinancing is in the money.  However, due to transaction 
                                                 
13
 Probability of negative equity=pneq =Φ(logV – logM)/sqrt(ω2)), where Φ(.) is the cumulative standard 
normal distribution function, V is the value of the property, M is the value of the mortgage, and sqrt(ω2) is 
the standard error of the OFHEO House Price Index.  The OFHEO HPI is estimated on paired sales of 
owner-occupied housing.  In the first stage the log price of the second sale price minus the log of the first 
sale is regressed on a series of dummies for each time period.  The dummy equals 1 for the time period of 
the second sale and -1 for the time period of the first sale.  In the second regression the square of the 
residuals are regressed on the number of time periods between transactions (k), ω2 = γ0 + γ1k+ γ2k2.  
OFHEO publishes the parameters γ1 and γ2 , which are used to calculate the estimated sqrt(ω2) or the 
standard error of the HPI (Sehpi).  See Deng, Quigley, and Van Order (2000) for an implementation of 
pneq in a mortgage performance model and Dreiman and Pennington-Cross (2004) for a detailed discussion 
of the second stage estimate of repeat sales indices. 
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costs and variations in expected duration of residence, the put option will not be 
instantaneously used by borrowers when interest rates drop.  Therefore, the continuous 
change is included in the specification.  
The cost of prepaying is also impacted by the existence of any prepayment penalties.  An 
indicator is included (Prepen) showing when any prepayment penalty is in effect.  It is 
expected that prepayment penalties will depress prepayments.  In addition, since the loan 
information is collected from securities, many of the loans are seasoned before being 
observed (left censored).  To control for any selection issues, the variable season is 
defined as the number of months since the loan was originated when first observed in the 
data set.  Therefore, unlike the age of the loan, season varies only in the cross-section 
(across loans) not over time as each loan ages. 
Termination Results 
Three different specifications results are presented in tables 9-12.  Specification I 
provides the naive specification, treating both cash-outs and non-cash-outs as the same.  
Specification II allows the baseline to shift up or down by including a dummy variable 
indicating if the loans is a cash-out.  Specification III tests to see if the cash-out loans 
have different responses to the incentives to prepay or default on the mortgage.  Table 11 
provides the marginal impact of increasing the non-baseline variables by one unit on the 
probability of default or prepayment.  The baseline is evaluated in the 18 to 24 months 
category reflecting the average observed age.  The marginal impact is expressed as a 
proportional increase or decrease in the probability, so that 0.11 indicates the hazard 
(default or prepay) rate increases 11 percent, not 11 percentage points. 
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In specification I, most variables have the expected signs.  Specification I and II have 
very similar coefficient estimates for all parameters.  For example, table 11 reports 
identical proportional marginal effects at two decimals.  However, cash-out loans on 
average tend to significantly default and prepay less than non-cash-out loans.  For the 
hazards of default and prepayment, the proportional impact is 11 and 9 percent, 
respectively.  
As shown in table 9, consistent with prior research, higher credit scores are associated 
with lower probabilities of default and higher probabilities of prepayment.  The 
probability of default is also sensitive to how much it is in the money to put the mortgage 
and default.  For example, higher cLTV and Sehpi are associated with higher default 
probabilities.  Therefore, the point estimate and the volatility of the point estimate have 
the anticipated impact.  Less equity is also associated with a lower probability of 
prepayment.  Again, this is consistent with prior literature and reflects the role of low and 
negative equity as a constraint on prepayment.  The volatility of house prices is 
associated with a higher probability of prepayment.  This result may indicate that, when 
individual house prices are volatile around average appreciation rates, it makes it more 
likely that some households will have a lot less equity than typical and thus find it harder 
to refinance.  
Ltv, the original LTV, has a negative coefficient indicating that loans with larger down 
payments tend to default less.  However, this impact is misleading because at origination 
Cltv and Ltv are equal, so the impact of origination is fully measured by the sum of the 
two coefficients, which is approximately 0.  Therefore, while the marginal impact of a 
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higher LTV is negative, thus reflecting stricter underwriting requirements for loans with 
smaller down payments, the total impact on the probability of default is zero in the first 
time period.  Over time, cLTV will diverge from Ltv and impact the default probability 
appropriately.  
Subprime borrowers’ decision to prepay is also sensitive to the cost of refinancing and 
the extent that it is in the money to refinance.  In particular, loans with a prepayment 
penalty are less likely to prepay.  In fact, prepayment penalties reduce the likelihood of 
prepaying by 18 percent.  Borrowers’ prepayment decision is also sensitive to changing 
interest rates.  For example, a one percentage point increase in interest rates reduces the 
probability of prepaying by 20 percent. 
The proxy for trigger events, the unemployment rate, has mixed results.  Higher 
unemployment rates are associated with higher prepayments, but have no statistically 
significant impact on defaults.  While these results differs from previous results found in 
the prime market, if unemployment leads to delinquency (a few missed payments, not 
foreclosure), it is consistent with Danis and Pennington-Cross (2005) who showed that 
delinquency in the subprime market marginally increases prepayments more than 
defaults.  
The age dummy variables indicate that the baseline or age-related hazard of default peaks 
at two to three years and the hazard of prepayment peaks at one to one and a half years.  
In addition, more seasoned loans tend to default more often and prepay less often.  This 
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result would be consistent with the notion that lenders tend to allow loans with marginal 
characteristics, observed or unobserved, more time before securitizing them. 
Specification III allows the coefficient estimates for all the non-baseline variables to be 
different for cash-out loans and non-cash-out loans.  Wald tests indicate that all cash-out 
versus non-cash-out coefficients are different at the 99 percent level except for Urate in 
the default hazard.  The fourth and fifth columns in table 11 provide the marginal 
proportional impacts of the variables for cash-out loans and non-cash-out loans.  These 
marginal impacts indicate that, while the Wald tests indicate statistical differences, not all 
variables have economically meaningful variations.  For example, the impact of 
increasing credit scores by 10 units leads to a 11 percent reduction in default for both 
cash-out loans and non-cash-out loans.  However, cash-out loans tend to be more 
responsive to the incentives to default.  In fact, the marginal impact of the option to put 
the mortgage (Cltv and sehpi) is almost twice as large as for cash-out loans.  Therefore, 
subprime borrowers who already cashed out the equity in their homes tend to be more 
responsive to negative equity positions and can be expected to default more often when 
house prices decline or house prices are very volatile.   
In terms of prepayment, cash-out and non-cash-out loans tend respond similarly to 
changes in the explanatory factors, except for the house price volatility and prepayment 
penalty.  Cash-out loans are more sensitive to sehpi, indicating that subprime borrowers 
will terminate (both prepay and default) more quickly when house prices are more 
volatile.  Furthermore, borrowers who cashed out the equity from their house respond 
much less to prepayment penalties than those borrowers who did not cash out the equity.  
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Prepayment penalties are also associated with a large increase in the probability of 
default for cash-out loans but have no impact on default for non-cash-out loans.  These 
results are consistent with Quercia, Stegman, and Davis (2005), who found that subprime 
loans with prepayment penalties tend to default more and prepay less.  Our results 
augment those and find that the increase in default occurs only for the loans taking cash 
out. 
While the prior section includes a measure of the seasoning of the loan before being 
securitized and reported in the data set, it may be that loans that are purchased quickly or 
slowly react differently to the economic incentives to default and prepay.  To test for this 
possibility the sample is split into three sub-samples or groups -- the first group includes 
loans seasoned up to and including 3 months, the second group includes loans seasoned 
more than 3 months and up to 6 months, and the last group includes loans seasoned more 
than 6 months.  The hazard model is re-estimated for each group separately using the 
appropriate baseline.14  Using specification III table 12 provides the marginal impact of 
the non-baseline explanatory variables for each seasoning group.  The default parameters 
are very stable across the three groups.  For example, the marginal impact of credit scores 
ranges from -9 to -11 percent for no cash-outs and -10 to -13 percent for cash-outs.  
However, there is some substantial variation.  For example, more seasoned cash-out loans 
are less sensitive to the equity position than loans with shorter seasoning periods.  In 
addition, in terms of prepayment loans that are seasoned over a longer period are less 
responsive to the incentives to refinance due to changing interest rates. 
                                                 
14
 During estimation the reference group is always the youngest available loan age, given the length of the 
seasoning.  
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Conclusion 
Housing equity has been credited with smoothing consumption through the 2001 
recession15 and thus helping to counteract the negative impacts of the 2000-2001 stock 
market decline. This paper examines the propensity of subprime households to extract 
equity while refinancing.  Most likely, because subprime households are credit- and 
liquidity-constrained (do not have other available sources of more liquid wealth), equity 
extraction is a very important segment of the subprime market, making up over 85 
percent of the observed subprime refinances over the 1996-2003 time period.   
Our results show that in the subprime market, lower incomes and rising house prices 
increase the likelihood of extracting equity while refinancing.  In addition, the Residential 
Finance Survey and the Survey of Consumers both indicate that the cash extracted during 
the refinance of an existing mortgage is often used to make general purchases, 
consolidate and pay off other outstanding consumer debt, or purchase a car.  We find 
evidence from individual loan-level data that subprime borrowers are actively 
substituting mortgage debt for credit card debt and car loans.  In particular, subprime 
borrowers are more likely to extract equity from their house when the prevailing relative 
interest rates of credit card or car loans rise.  These findings indicate that, in the subprime 
market, despite being liquidity- and credit-constrained, borrowers do respond to the 
relative cost of borrowing and attempt to finance consumption in the cheapest manner 
possible. 
                                                 
15
 The National Bureau of Economic research dates the contraction from March 2001 through November 
2001. 
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In addition, while cash-out loans on average tend to default and prepay less than non-
cash-out loans, cash-out loans are more sensitive to declining house prices than non-cash-
out loans.  Specifically, the proportional increase in the probability of default is over 75 
percent higher for cash-outs than non-cash-outs (∆7%/ ∆4%−1) in response to a 10-
percentage point reduction in homeowner equity (current LTV).
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Table 1: Reasons to Refinance 
Reason All Loans Prime Loans Subprime Loans 
  
# of 
Loans 
Percent 
of All 
Loans 
# of 
Loans 
Percent of 
Prime 
Loans 
# of 
Loans 
Percent of 
Subprime 
Loans 
Lower interest 
rate                                                                                       1,624 64.1 1,551 66.0 73 39.7 
Increase 
payment period                                                                     21 0.8 20 0.9 1 0.5 
Reduce 
payment period                                                                     74 2.9 67 2.8 7 3.8 
Renew or 
extend a loan 
that had fallen 
due 55 2.2 51 2.2 4 2.2 
Receive cash    694 27.4 604 25.7 90 48.9 
Other reason - 
Specify                   67 2.6 58 2.5 9 4.9 
Total 2,535 100 2,351 100 184 100 
Source: Calculations from the 2001 Residential Finance Survey, home owners file. 
 
 
Table 2: Detailed Reasons for Cash-out Refinance 
Reason # of Loans 
Percent of 
Cash-outs 
Start a business 21 3.0 
Consolidate debt                                                                             589 84.9
Settle a divorce                         37 5.3 
Pay expenses                                                                              93 13.4
Pay taxes 38 5.5 
Buy products 37 5.3 
Invest in real estate                                   89 12.8 
Improve property                                                                              593 85.4 
Buy a vehicle                                                                              120 17.3 
Source: Calculations from the 2001 Residential Finance Survey, 
home owners file.  Loans may have more than one reason for 
taking cash out. 
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Table 3: Summary Statisitcs of Borrower, Housing, and Mortgage Characteristics 
 
 No Cash-out Cash-out 
Variable 
Description 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
FICO Fair Isaac’s credit score at 
origination. Source: Loan level 
data.  649.17 72.41 645.68 66.31 
Age Median age of people living the 
five digit zip code (zip code 
tabulation area).  Source: 2000 
Census. 35.18 4.68 35.05 4.60 
NYoung Indicator of Age greater than or 
equal to 35 years.  0.53 0.50 0.51 0.50 
NYoung*Age Interaction of (Age-35) and 
NYoung. 1.80 3.08 1.68 3.08 
Income Median household income in the 
five digit zip code (zip code 
tabulation area). Source: 2000 
Census. 47,277 16,089 45,193 14,298 
∆urate Change in the metropolitan area 
unemployment rate in the month 
prior to origination.  Source: 
Bureau of Labor and Statistics. 0.01 0.51 0.02 0.52 
∆hpi Percent change in metropolitan 
area house prices in the quarter 
before the loan is originated.  
Source: Office of Federal Housing 
Enterprise and Oversight repeat 
sales house price index (OFHEO 
HPI). 1.51 1.19 1.44 1.15 
∆i Change in mortgage interest rates 
over the one month prior to 
origination.  Source: The 30-year 
fixed rate mortgage interest rate 
reported by Freddie Mac in 
Primary Mortgage Market Survey 
(PMMS). -0.07 0.43 -0.06 0.44 
Number of Loans Number of loans originated. 
Source: Loan level data. 12,964  74,067  
Fixed-rate owner-occupied loans originated from 1996 through 2003.   See text for more details on the data set. 
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Table 4: Summary Statistics of Cost of Consumer Credit and Year of Origination 
Characteristics 
 
 No Cash-out Cash-out 
Variable 
Description 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
icc/im Ratio of the prevailing interest 
rates for credit cards and 
mortgages.  Source: Commercial 
bank interest rate on credit cards 
as reported by the Federal 
Reserve Board and PMMS. 2.10 0.16 2.06 0.16 
icar/im Ratio of the prevailing interest 
rates for cars and mortgages.  
Source: Commercial bank interest 
rate on 48 month new car loans 
and PMMS. 0.71 0.19 0.77 0.20 
yr96 Indicator of loan originated in 
1996. Source: Loan level. 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.12 
yr97 Indicator of loan originated in 
1997. Source: Loan level.  0.04 0.20 0.05 0.21 
yr98 Indicator of loan originated in 
1998. Source: Loan level. 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.29 
yr99 Indicator of loan originated in 
1999. Source: Loan level.  0.10 0.30 0.16 0.37 
yr00 Indicator of loan originated in 
2000. Source: Loan level. 0.08 0.27 0.14 0.35 
yr01 Indicator of loan originated in 
2001. Source: Loan level. 0.12 0.33 0.19 0.39 
yr02 Indicator of loan originated in 
2002. Source: Loan level. 0.21 0.41 0.16 0.37 
yr03 Indicator of loan originated in 
2003. Source: Loan level. 0.35 0.48 0.19 0.39 
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Table 5: Logit Choice Results: The Likelihood of Extracting Equity 
Panel A: Coefficient Estimates 
  I. Base II. Credit Card III. Car 
Variable  Coefficient z-stat Coefficient z-stat Coefficient z-stat 
Borrower FICO 0.005 0.4 0.005 0.3 0.004 0.3 
 Age 0.135*** 3.2 0.134** 3.2 0.133*** 3.1 
 Age*NYoung -0.211*** -3.4 -0.211*** -3.4 -0.208*** -3.4 
 Income -0.085*** -12.8 -0.085*** -12.8 -0.085*** -12.8 
 ∆urate 0.191 1.0 0.202 1.1 0.222 1.2 
Housing ∆hpi 0.030*** 3.6 0.030*** 3.6 0.026*** 3.0 
 ∆i -0.060** -2.3    
Credit Card Cost (icc/im)  0.161* 1.7  
Car Cost (icar/im)   0.382*** 5.5 
Other yr96 1.953*** 14.1 1.988*** 14.1 1.678*** 11.4 
 yr97 0.749*** 14.7 0.787*** 14.9 0.624*** 11.1 
 yr98 0.674*** 18.4 0.681*** 18.7 0.552*** 12.7 
 yr99 1.103*** 30.4 1.117*** 26.5 0.954*** 23.1 
 yr00 1.250*** 33.4 1.313*** 24.8 1.159*** 28.2 
 yr01 1.028*** 31.9 1.073*** 29.5 0.961*** 27.6 
 yr02 0.354*** 12.7 0.403*** 11.5 0.342*** 12.4 
 constant 0.991*** 6.0 0.638** 2.3 0.795*** 4.7 
 
Log of 
Likelihood -35,304.1  -35,305.4  -35,291.9  
 
Panel B: Marginal Effects: The Change in the Probability to Extracting Equity 
Variable  I. Base II. Credit Card III. Car 
Borrower FICO 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
 Age 2.5% 2.5% 2.4% 
 Age*NYoung -3.9% -4.0% -3.7% 
 Income -1.6% -1.6% -1.5% 
 ∆urate 3.5% 3.8% 4.0% 
Housing ∆hpi 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 
 ∆i -1.1%   
Credit Card Cost (icc/im)  3.0%  
Car Cost (icar/im)   6.8% 
Other yr96 20.1% 20.7% 17.9% 
 yr97 11.2% 11.9% 9.3% 
 yr98 10.3% 10.6% 8.4% 
 yr99 14.8% 15.2% 12.8% 
 yr00 16.0% 16.8% 14.6% 
 yr01 14.1% 14.8% 12.9% 
 yr02 5.9% 6.8% 5.5% 
The dependent variable is 1 is the refinance takes out cash and 0 otherwise. FICO is divided by 100, 
income is divided by 10,000, age is divided by 10, and ∆urate is divided by 10.  ∆i is dropped from the 
specifications II and II because of a high rate of correlation with icc/im and icar/im .  Marginal effects are 
reported for a one unit change in the variable and all other variables are evaluated at their means.  Dummy 
variables are evaluated as 0 to 1 changes. 
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Table 6: Parameter Stability and Origination Years  
  
Year of Origination 
Variable Variable 1996-98 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Borrower FICO 0.64* 0.60* 0.52* 0.07 -0.37* -0.48* 
 Age 0.04 0.44* 0.34* 0.06 0.11 0.11 
 Age*NYoung -0.06 -0.70* -0.57* -0.22 -0.22* -0.05 
 Income -0.03 -0.04* -0.10* -0.11* -0.07* -0.10* 
 ∆urate 0.25 0.02 -0.22 -0.57 0.26 0.10 
Housing ∆hpi -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.08* 
 ∆i -0.79* 0.22* -0.19* -0.20* 0.30* -0.16* 
The dependent variable is 1 is the refinance takes out cash and 0 otherwise.  Each column provides 
the estimated coefficient using the base model specification and only loans from the origination 
year indicated; * indicates that the coefficient estimated is statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level or better. 
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Table 7: Description of Termination Data Set 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. 
Default 
Indicator that the loan defaulted in the 
current month.  Default is defined as a loan 
entering foreclosure or becoming real estate 
owned property.  Source: loan level data. 0.0027 0.05 
Prepay 
Indicator that the loan prepaid in the current 
month.  Prepaid is defined as a loan being 
paid in full whether delinquent or current in 
the prior month.   Source: loan level data. 0.0205 0.14 
Lage 
The number of months since the loan was 
originated in each month, or loan age. 22.2542 16.30 
Fico 
Fair Isaac’s consumer credit score at 
origination divided by 10. Source: loan level 
data. 64.5461 6.60 
Ltv 
The loan to value ratio at origination.  
Source: loan level data. 91.0438 22.24 
Cltv 
The current loan to value ratio in each 
month. Source: House price is updated 
using the Office of federal housing 
Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) repeat sales 
house price index (HPI) for the state.  The 
loan balance in each month is observed in 
the loan level data. 79.3761 22.22 
Sehpi 
The standard error of the OFHEO HPI.  This 
measure of price uncertainty measures the 
diffusion of individual property prices around 
the estimated index as the time period 
between the observed (origination) price and 
the current price increases.  Source: OFHEO 
HPI state diffusion parameters. 7.9701 3.19 
Season 
The age of the loan when first observed in 
the data set reflecting the seasoning of the 
loan when securitized. Source: loan level 
data. 5.8262 10.15 
Prepen 
An indicator that the loan has a prepayment 
penalty in effect for the current month. 
Source: loan level data. 0.5717 0.49 
∆I 
The change in prevailing 30-year fixed rate 
mortgage interest rates from the date of 
origination to the current month.  Source: 
The Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market 
Survey. -0.5039 0.87 
Urate 
The metropolitan area unemployment rate in 
the current month. Source: the U.S. Bureau 
of labor and Statistics, 4.8125 1.98 
Cash-out 
Indicator that the loan was originated as a 
refinance loan taking cash out.  The 
reference loan type is refinance loans not 
taking any cash out.  Source: loan level data. 0.8809 0.32 
Observations 
Number of observation in the panel 
estimation data set.   Source: loan level 
data. Same loans as included in table 3 and 
4. 1,785,480  
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Table 8: Summary Statistics of the Termination Data Set: Cash-out and Non-cash-
out Refinances 
 No Cash-out Cash-out 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Default 0.0036 0.06 0.0026 0.05 
Prepay 0.0199 0.14 0.0206 0.14 
Lage 20.1726 16.56 22.5357 16.24 
Fico 63.6323 7.17 64.6697 6.51 
Ltv 79.7324 14.23 92.5734 22.69 
Cltv 71.4014 15.80 80.4545 22.74 
Sehpi 7.4925 3.31 8.0347 3.17 
Season 5.4380 10.28 5.8787 10.14 
Prepen 0.5446 0.50 0.5753 0.49 
∆I -0.4263 0.81 -0.5144 0.87 
Urate 4.8776 1.97 4.8037 1.98 
Observations 212,683  1,572,797  
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Table 9: The Likelihood of Defaulting and Prepaying 
  I II 
  Coefficient z-stat Coefficient z-stat 
Default     
 Lage<=6 -0.905*** -4.1 -0.895*** -4.1 
 6< Lage <=8 0.163 0.8 0.174 0.9 
 8< Lage <=10 0.416** 2.2 0.427** 2.3 
 10< Lage <=12 0.581*** 3.2 0.591*** 3.3 
 12< Lage <=18 0.579*** 3.5 0.590*** 3.5 
 18< Lage <=24 0.651*** 4.2 0.661*** 4.3 
 24< Lage <=36 0.669*** 4.8 0.678*** 4.9 
 36< Lage <=48 0.599*** 4.8 0.605*** 4.8 
 48< Lage <=60 0.602*** 5.0 0.604*** 5.0 
 Fico -0.109*** -45.5 -0.109*** -45.4 
 Ltv -0.071*** -19.0 -0.070*** -18.8 
 Cltv 0.067*** 16.5 0.067*** 16.4 
 Sehpi 0.134*** 9.4 0.133*** 9.4 
 Season 0.017*** 11.3 0.017*** 11.3 
 Prepen 0.189*** 5.9 0.190*** 6.0 
 ∆I -0.145*** -8.4 -0.146*** -8.5 
 Urate -0.008 -0.9 -0.007 -0.9 
 Cash-out  -0.105*** -2.5 
 Constant -0.043 -0.2 0.016 0.1 
Prepay    
 Lage<=6 -0.722*** -10.1 -0.720*** -10.1 
 6< Lage <=8 0.092 1.4 0.096 1.5 
 8< Lage <=10 0.291*** 4.8 0.295*** 4.9 
 10< Lage <=12 0.458*** 7.9 0.463*** 8.0 
 12< Lage <=18 0.633*** 12.6 0.637*** 12.6 
 18< Lage <=24 0.529*** 11.5 0.534*** 11.6 
 24< Lage <=36 0.350*** 8.9 0.355*** 9.0 
 36< Lage <=48 0.275*** 7.9 0.278*** 8.0 
 48< Lage <=60 0.198*** 5.9 0.199*** 5.9 
 Fico 0.012*** 13.5 0.012*** 13.5 
 Ltv 0.022*** 41.7 0.022*** 41.8 
 Cltv -0.032*** -60.7 -0.032*** -60.7 
 Sehpi 0.023*** 4.5 0.023*** 4.6 
 Season -0.012*** -20.7 -0.012*** -20.7 
 Prepen -0.181*** -16.2 -0.180*** -16.1 
 ∆I -0.208*** -32.1 -0.209*** -32.2 
 Urate 0.025*** 9.6 0.025*** 9.5 
 Cash-out  -0.085*** -4.9 
 Constant -4.755*** -48.0 -4.705*** -47.2 
 
Log of 
Likelihood -200,817.9  -200,802.3 
The hazard is estimated using multinomial logit in STATA.   All variables are scaled as shown in tables 8 
and 9. 
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Table 10: The Likelihood of Defaulting and Prepaying: Cash-outs vs. Non-cash-outs 
 Baseline  Cash-out  No Cash-out  
 Coefficent z-stat Coefficent z-stat Coefficent z-stat 
Panel A: Default 
      
constant -0.193 -0.7     
Lage<=6 -0.905*** -4.1     
6< Lage <=8 0.169 0.9     
8< Lage <=10 0.424** 2.2     
10< Lage <=12 0.589*** 3.2     
12< Lage <=18 0.587*** 3.5     
18< Lage <=24 0.656*** 4.2     
24< Lage <=36 0.673*** 4.8     
36< Lage <=48 0.599*** 4.8     
48< Lage <=60 0.602*** 5.0     
Fico   -0.109*** -42.7 -0.106*** -27.3 
Ltv   -0.076*** -18.6 -0.032*** -3.8 
Cltv   0.072*** 16.1 0.037*** 4.4 
Sehpi   0.149*** 10.4 0.063*** 2.9 
Season   0.017*** 10.6 0.014*** 3.8 
Prepen   0.228*** 6.5 -0.006 -0.1 
∆I   -0.154*** -8.3 -0.081* -1.9 
Urate   -0.006 -0.7 -0.024 -1.0 
Panel B: Prepay 
     
constant -4.761*** -47.8     
Lage<=6 -0.727*** -10.2     
6< Lage <=8 0.093 1.5     
8< Lage <=10 0.294*** 4.8     
10< Lage <=12 0.463*** 8.0     
12< Lage <=18 0.639*** 12.7     
18< Lage <=24 0.535*** 11.7     
24< Lage <=36 0.357*** 9.0     
36< Lage <=48 0.281*** 8.0     
48< Lage <=60 0.202*** 6.0     
Fico  0.011*** 11.4 0.018*** 12.4 
Ltv  0.022*** 40.7 0.026*** 11.1 
Cltv  -0.032*** -59.3 -0.035*** -15.9 
Sehpi  0.025*** 4.9 0.007 0.8 
Season  -0.012*** -19.5 -0.012*** -7.1 
Prepen  -0.154*** -13.0 -0.372*** -11.7 
∆I  -0.210*** -30.7 -0.191*** -9.5 
Urate  0.028*** 10.1 -0.003 -0.3 
Log of Likelihood -200,726.7      
The hazard is estimated using multinomial logit in STATA.   All variables are scaled as shown in tables 8 
and 9. 
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Table 11: Marginal Effects on Default/Prepayment Probabilities: Cash-out vs. Non-
cash-outs 
  I II III 
    
Cash-out No Cash-out 
Default      
 Fico -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 
 Ltv -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.03 
 Cltv 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.04 
 Sehpi 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.06 
 Season 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 
 Prepen 0.19 0.19 0.23 0.00 
 ∆I -0.14 -0.14 -0.15 -0.08 
 Urate -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
 Cash-out  -0.11   
Prepay      
 Fico 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
 Ltv 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
 Cltv -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
 Sehpi 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 
 Season -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 Prepen -0.18 -0.18 -0.15 -0.37 
 ∆I -0.20 -0.20 -0.20 -0.19 
 Urate 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.00 
 Cash-out  -0.09   
The proportional marginal effect is the percent change (not percentage point change) 
in the probability of the hazard (default or prepay) caused by a one unit increase in 
the variable of interest.  Loan age is set to the category indicated by the mean age in 
the sample (18<Lage<=24) and all other variables are evaluated at their means. In 
addition, reflecting the use of a cash-out or a no cash-out loan, in specification III 
when the cash-out marginal effects are calculated the cash-out dummy and all it’s 
interaction variables are set to 1 and when the no cash-out marginal effects are 
calculated the cash-out dummy and all it’s interaction variables are set to 0. 
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Table 12: Seasoning and Marginal Effects on Default/Prepayment Probabilities  
  
Cash-out No Cash-out 
  
Seasoning Length in Months Seasoning Length in Months 
default  S<=3 3<S<=6     S>6 S<=3 3<S<=6   S>6 
 Fico -0.11 -0.13 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 -0.09 
 Ltv -0.09 -0.13 -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 
 Cltv 0.09 0.13 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.03 
 Sehpi 0.18 0.25 0.10 0.09 0.17 0.05 
 Season -0.13 0.15 0.02 0.01 -0.10 0.02 
 Prepen 0.15 0.24 0.31 -0.08 0.16 0.09 
 ∆I 0.01 -0.30 -0.32 -0.04 -0.13 -0.12 
 Urate 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.05 -0.03 0.02 
prepay   
 Fico 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 
 Ltv 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 
 Cltv -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 
 Sehpi 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.00 
 Season 0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.05 -0.10 -0.01 
 Prepen -0.21 -0.21 0.04 -0.35 -0.37 -0.10 
 ∆I -0.24 -0.24 -0.13 -0.21 -0.29 -0.07 
 Urate -0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.00 
S indicates the number of months that the loans used to estimate the reported coefficients were seasoned 
before being observed in the data set and likely securitized.  The proportional marginal effect is the percent 
change (not percentage point change) in the probability of the hazard (default or prepay) caused by a one 
unit increase in the variable of interest.  Using specification III loan age is set to the category indicated by 
the mean age in the sample (18<Lage<=24) and all other variables are evaluated at their means.
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Figure 1: 
Conditional Prepay Rate Comparison
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Figure 2: 
Conditional Default Rate Comparison
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